

## Andrew Jackson to John Adair, July 23, 1817, from Correspondence of Andrew Jackson. Edited by John Spencer Bassett.

**TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN ADAIR.<sup>1</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> From the *Knoxville Register*, Sept. 4, 1817.

Nashville, July 23, 1817.

Gen. John Adair,

*Sir*—On my return to this place from Hiwassee, whither my duties called me nearly two months since, I was presented with the Lexington Reporter containing your letter addressed from Natchez to its editors dated 6th May 1817.

The surprise you profess to feel, at reading my letter of the 11th April, cannot be real for it is well known you left Kentucky after the 28th of February, when the publication appeared, which drew from me that communication a publication which contained a forgery under the sanction of my name, and which was given to the world, for the purpose of tarnishing the reputation of two brave officers (Patterson and Morgan) whose conduct during the campaign below New Orleans, merited and received my entire approbation—A publication containing, too, an extract from the “History of the late war in the western country”, which held me up to the world as having been dragooned by you into “a dry, reluctant sentence of justification” towards the fugitives on the right bank of the Mississippi. Your having seen this previously to your leaving Kentucky, with a knowledge of its falsity, should have allayed your surprise, while a just magnanimity, corresponding with the high respect, and exalted sense of my worth, professed to be felt and expressed by you in your letter to Colonel Anderson, from the Greenville springs, of the 28th August 1815, should have

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induced you, to have given so base a production, a prompt and positive contradiction the instant it appeared. Having omitted to do this you had no right to calculate on my silence:—Nay sir, your having left the country without doing it, too evidently manifested a continuation of that deception and misrepresentation which is discoverable in your letter to me of the 20th March, and to Governor Shelby of the 10th of April 1815.

It is you, General, who appear to write to the Editors in a passion, and this passion does not arise from an expression of mine but from an error in the Editors; whether it be accident or design, is for you and themselves to decide; they have published it correctly in a note in the same paper and corrected it, in a subsequent one:—it is a subject on which I feel no concern. On this, as on similar occasions, when any become irritated with me, on false promises or information, and make loud complaints thro' public prints of acts never done, I regard it not, such passions always subside without injury.

You ask through the Reporter an explanation of my allusion to the “Spanish Dish”. It will not be given: my letter speaks for itself. It is plain and without innuendo. You are charged by the Historian with having furnished the forgery commented on, you can read it coolly, and draw your own conclusions. This is my only explanation.

I am astonished at your impudence, to speak of *fighting battles over again*. You well know sir, that your misrepresentations and falsehoods, combined with those of your colleague, and the Editors of a newspaper, have been disturbing the tranquility of the public mind, by endeavoring to cast a stigma on the well earned fame of brave meritorious officers and seeking to convince the world, that men were heroes who ingloriously fled before the enemy.

For the purpose of forestalling public opinion, you have expressed a fear that I will not do you justice. This is only deception, for you know me better. As far as I know it you shall have the truth. The evidence will be your verbal and written reports, your acknowledgements; and the official statements and certifiates of correct and honorable

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men. The truth shall be told. Where you deserve praise, it will be bestowed and where you have willfully and knowingly misrepresented, it will be as freely commented on, and yourself exposed.

Your letter to me of the 20th March 1815, must have been written upon a supposition that my love of popular applause could not withstand the desire of ingratiating myself with those, comparatively, few Kentuckians who had tarnished their reputation or my vanity, your flattering encomiums. (I believe I may say that I have always enjoyed the good opinion of the virtuous and brave Kentuckians, and I hope I ever shall.) In my answer however, you found your mistake, and met with a reply that negatived your overgrown numbers on the left bank; while my disbelief respecting the borrowed arms on the 7th from the corps of exempts was strongly, though silently marked.

I did suppose that after that answer, you would have had more prudence than to have given publicity to statements, convinced as you must have been, that there were many who knew them to be incorrect, particularly those in your letter to Governor Shelby. You must have acted from an apprehension that I would either be kept in ignorance of, or not notice them. At least, you considered the end in view justified the risk and that your coming forward as champion would ensure your popularity, and seat you in the Governmental chair of Kentucky, or the senate of the United States. Your letter to Colonel Anderson of the 28th of August was evidently written to be shown to me, believing that my silence would be thereby secured. I annex it here, together with one from Col. Anderson to Major Reid, my aid-de-camp, that a clue may be afforded by which to develop your conduct.<sup>2</sup>

2 The letter from Adair to Col. Anderson follows:

“ Greenville Springs, August 28, 1815.

“Your packet by Mr Norvell has just come to hand. Since I last wrote you I have not seen or heard from Mr S. M'Kee. He has not yet resigned. I lately had a visit from a very intelligent gentleman from the Northeast; and although he managed somewhat in the

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yankee style I have no doubt his object was to find out whether General Jackson would be supported in the west, if brought forward as a candidate for the presidency. I gave it as my opinion that he would be supported in Louisiana, and Tennessee, and Kentucky, by a little exertion he would get all the votes but two and that I was not certain they would be against him. (I mean the district represented by Mr Clay and Col. Johnson) He assured me there was a strong disposition in many of the North-Eastern states to run him, if they could be assured he would be supported in the west. He was extremely anxious that I should go to the Federal city this winter as a member if possible, but if that cannot be, he wished me to spend the month of January there as a private gentleman. I would write to the General on the subject, but am induced to believe (from questions that have been asked me by different gentlemen from Tennessee that the General has from some cause, some misrepresentation of my conduct, become offended with me. It cannot be on account of my letter to him in New Orleans. He well knows, or ought to have known, that one object with me in writing that letter, and not the least, was to put it in his power to do away at once, a strong and growing irritation among the Kentucky troops, occasioned solely by the return of his official letter, as published in the newspapers although that letter was founded on the best authority the General had when he wrote it, yet certainly when he was in possession of more correct information, it was his duty to correct any errors he might have been led into from the official report of others as to the number of the Kentuck troops, who fought on the east side of the river. I have not a doubt the General was not well informed. This was not his fault. If in the hurry of the times, there was any one to blame the fault would seem to be between Col. Butler and my—. If the Colonel will examine his orderly book, he will find the detail for the guard on the 8th, 9th, 10th, etc. was from my command 71 rank and file, from Gen. Carroll 92 or thereabouts. I now write from memory, making my command 950, and his about 1200 fit for duty. This at present is of little importance. I would be sorry, however, that the General would be misled by the idle tales of others, who are, most probably, not more his friends than mine.

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“Should you have an opportunity I wish you could know his sentiments on the subject of becoming a candidate for President. The sooner perhaps the better. I am afraid Mr Crawford will not do—you already know my sentiments on this subject.”

Extract of a letter from Col. Anderson to Major Reid: “Harrodsburg, Oct. 17th, 1815. Conformably to promise, I have transmitted to General Jackson the publication made at the instance of Major Helm. It is the same which was spoken of in Nashville, and of which he was totally ignorant. How this fellow Helm (who by the bye is a very trifling lying man) will be able to account for this very extraordinary conduct, no one can tell. He furnished the documents as they are published, to the editor of the Palladium. I made strict inquiry of him to this point. General Adair tells me he wrote to General Thomas on the subject, and his reply was that he knew nothing about such publications as Major Helm had made; so Helm cannot shield himself under his authority.”

From these letter[s] it appears that you were much my friend—that you were endeavoring to search for the author of the falsehoods, with the *manifest* design of having everything corrected, that no blame should be attached to me, if blame were anywhere, it was with yourself and Col. Butler, who failed to report to me. How far this accords with your letters to Governor Shelby and the Editors of the Reporter, an impartial public will determine.

One word on that part of your letter to Colonel Anderson in relation to the comparative numbers detailed for duty from Gen. Carroll's division, and the Kentucky detachment under your command. Of the troops immediately on the lines, one half, or one third as occasion seemed to require, were night and day under arms. There was likewise, from these, a detail for guard and fatigue duty. Your detachment was not on the lines, and with the guard, had but an occasional fatigue duty to perform;—justice therefore required that a larger detail, in proportion to their respective aggregates, should be made from your detachment, than from those of the lines. The order was given accordingly, which sufficiently accounts for the augmented number of your detail.

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I will now take into consideration your letter to Governor Shelby with such parts of your[s] to me as may relate to the same subject. You observe in your letter to Governor Shelby: —“General Jackson in his answer to my letter, seems still to think our numbers on the east bank, in the battle, did not exceed 550 men, and this opinion is founded on our morning report of the 12th which made our number 959.”

I ask sir, in what part of my answer does it appear that my opinion was founded on that report? It was founded on your verbal report, when you arrived at Head Quarters with your detachment, your verbal reports, until the battle of the 8th, the opinion of my Adjutant General, my aid-de-camp, Major Reid, General Carroll, Maj. Dillahunty, and upon the express declaration of Major Thomas L. Butler, that no arms were procured from the corps of exempts until after the battle of the 8th, as well as your report of the 12th, which showed that after the arms brought with you, those taken from the enemy and those transferred from General Carroll's division, your whole number on the 12th amounted to but 959. These reasons combined with many others that might be added, induced me to state to you in my answer, “thus sir, although the kentucky force in the action of that day has been stated at 550, I am induced to think, from the best means I has of judging, that it was even less.” Was this seeming to think? Was this resting my opinion alone on that report? But sir, that report alone is conclusive that on the 8th you had not, on my line, more than 550. In your letter to me of the 20th of March, you say, “Your (my) report is strictly true so far as it relates to the arrival of the Kentucky troops and to the situation on your lines on the 5th and 6th of January, not more than 550 of them being armed until the—th,” Now sir, unless you can make it appear that on the evening of the 7th between 6 and [700] of the Kentuckians were armed—and marched to my lines it follows that the statement in your letter to Governor Shelby, where you say, “I am even well assured that we had in the battle on the east bank, officers and men nearly 1200” must be incorrect. You have never dared to assert that you reported to me on the evening of the 7th, or at any other time, until the troops were disbanded, that you had received any augmentation of force on the evening of the 7th and surely 6 or 700 men marching into my camp would have been noticed and

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spoken of nay more, if it had been the fact, and that too, on the eve of an expected battle, you, being with me on that night, would have eagerly reported this pleasing intelligence, at the time you reported the march of the 400 Kentuckians under the command of Col. Davis, to reinforce General Morgan, agreeably to order. Let us see in what manner you accounted for this augmentation in your command. You proceed thus—"On the 7th I received from the corps of exempts in the city, between 4 and 500 muskets and bayonets, on a loan for three days. With this timely supply of arms, we were enabled to bring on the lines, on the morning of the 8th fully 1000 men." Let us contrast this with the statement of my aid-de-camp, Major Thomas L. Butler, a correct and honorable Kentuckian, who, on the 23d of December 1814, was left in command of the city of New Orleans, and the corps of exempts, amounted to between three hundred and three hundred and fifty men, in whom every confidence was placed, having at stake their families and firesides. He states positively that this corps reported to him daily, and that you obtained no arms from them until after the battle of the 8th of January, with his knowledge. Thus sir, is the falsehood in your statement evident. Was it thus, sir, that your misrepresentations were made to appease the growing irritation of the Kentuckians, as you have expressed yourself in your letter to Col. Anderson?

It was my knowledge of this fact, that (in my answer to your letter) induced me to pass over this part of your statement with silent contempt. Previously to this sir, I had confidence in you; but the moment I read that letter, it vanished. It was my belief of the falsehood of that statement that induced me to put the question to your friends, the Editors of the Reporter, "why, if you had obtained those arms from New Orleans, you did not place them in the hands of Col. Davis's command? I now repeat the question, why was this not done? And why was not the fact of your having borrowed those arms reported to me? If you borrowed them from the exempt corps, to whom the defence of the city of New Orleans was entrusted, without my knowledge, or that of the officer commanding, it will be difficult for you to justify yourself for this omission. Not only the whole city, but the whole country might have been lost by so unprecedented and unmilitary act. After the battle of



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the 8th, the city thereby being placed in safety I determined to make an attempt to cut off the communication of the enemy with their shipping. I then directed Major Butler to procure from the corps of exempts, in the city their arms, etc. and to place them in the hands of General Coffee's brigade and the Kentuckians:—This he states was done—100 being delivered to Genl. Coffee, the balance, about 230, was delivered to your command. You cannot have forgotten, sir, my sending for and consulting with you and Gen. Coffee on this subject When I asked what confidence you had in your troops, to aid in this enterprise, you replied that your command was undisciplined and insubordinate, the officers for the most part, inexperienced that they would fight behind their breastworks, but that no confidence could be placed in them, if brought into the open plain, and opposed to veteran troops.

To return to your letter to Governor Shelby, you state that “between the morning of the 1st and 12th no additional strength had been placed under my command three or four companies from Gen. Thomas's camp had been armed with guns taken, and placed on the right of our line near the river, as I understand, to reinforce that part defended by the regular troops; but these companies were not under my command, nor included in *any morning report from me*”. Let me ask you sir, if not under my command, under whose command were they? By my orders you were invested with the command of all the Kentucky troops (Gen. Thomas being sick and unfit for duty). All orders issued to them went thro' you, and your Adjutant General's office. This, sir, is another willful misrepresentation. Why on the receipt of my letter of 2d of April in answer to yours of the 20th of March, did you not, with that boldness that truth always inspires, say to me (for we were then both on the same spot) that your numbers were greater than I had admitted in my answer that the troops on the right of the line were not either reported by you, or under my command—that I had said nothing of the men armed with those *secretly* borrowed muskets from the corps of exempts and that you were ready to prove this from the reports and testimony of the officers? Why, I ask, was this course not pursued? I answer, that you knew you were where all the proofs were at hand, and your false statements could, in a moment, be detected, and refuted and the only mode left to obtain your popular views,



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was to write to your Governor, calculating that the misrepresentations which your letter contained would never be exposed. In this you have been mistaken and the report of your Assistant Adjutant General of the 13th of January blasts your character as a man of veracity forever.

The report of the 12th of January is in your own handwriting. On that day Col. Davis, with his detachment, recrossed the river and is included in your report of the 15th of Jan. which is hereto annexed<sup>3</sup> What say you now sir? Were those men not under your command and reported by you? I doubt whether your friends, the Editors, of the Reporter, will be able to find an excuse for you in this barefaced falsehood.

This exposure at once shows, why your letter to Gov. Shelby was not published in full, before it appeared in the Reporter of the 2d of last

3 This foot-note is by Jackson, as are others attached to this letter:

“A Detachment Report of the Kentucky Militia, under command of Brig. Gen. Adair, Command'g January 16, 1815.

Fit for duty. Sick. On duty. Deserted. On furlough. Privates 1145 229 21 8 5 1408  
Corporals 69 15 84 Sergeants 80 12 92 Ensigns 17 5 22 Lieutenants 19 3 22 Captains  
Captains 4 22 Majors 3 1 4 Lieut. Col's 1656

“Captain Peacock's and Capt. Terrills companies, with one hundred and six men, including officers and non-commissioned officers stationed on the extreme right in the rear of the batteries, are included in the above report.

“ John A. Meaux, Ass't A. G. “A true copy. Robert Butler, A. G.”

May<sup>4</sup> and also why the Editors of that paper published my answer to you, in the mutilated manner it did.

4 If it was ever published before in full, it was not seen by me.

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It is well known I had every disposition to be silent if I could have remained so without injustice to others. I had every thing prepared for a full exposure of those wicked falsehoods, that were agitated ostensibly by Helms in 1815 when his letter to me was received, and when your letter to Col. Anderson was shewn. I had reason to hope that the falsehoods had been contradicted, justice done, and the unpleasant scenes forgotten in the recollection of the achievements of meritorious officers and soldiers. I was then silent: but finding those falsehoods and slanders reiterated, justice towards brave and meritorious men urged me forward. But to proceed sir, you say in your letter to Governor Shelby "I am even well assured that we had in the battle, on the east bank, officers and men, nearly 1200; for a number of men when the order was issued on the 7th to deliver the arms from the 13th to the 15th Regiment and from Major Crenshaw's battallion to Major Harrison's, did not obey the order, but believing we were to be attacked, concealed their arms and volunteered on the lines with their friends; those men were not reported". What! your men not obey orders, General, and no punishment inflicted upon them? A fine military example truly; and well accounts for the insubordination of your command. And how did it happen sir, that these men were not reported, when you knew the fact. I must confess it is to me unaccountable, considering that you were ordered on the 5th of January to detail all the Kentuckians, who had arms fit for service and all those for whom arms could be procured to assume the command—march them to my line of defence—encamp them in the rear of Gen'l Carroll's division and in the event of an alarm or attack, to cover and support him.<sup>5</sup> That those men who were armed, and fit for service in the field, should have been permitted to loiter in the camp of General Thomas and my orders disobeyed and this within your knowledge, after you had reported it had been complied with, and that your covering detachment was about 500 strong is, indeed, strange. Were you preparing, if defeat and disaster happened, to state your command below its real strength, but if victory resulted, to swell it far above? And was this the reason we could get no written report from you. Your conduct throughout would induce this opinion.

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5 On the 5.. January, General Adair received—which was the only arms furnished him until after the battle of the—.

Let us return to your letter to Governor Shelby:—"I have obtained" you say "from Col. Latour, the chief engineer, a draft which will show the extent of our lines, and the space occupied by each corps. Our whole line was between 10 and 11000 yards long. The regular troops and part of the militia from Louisiana occupied—yards on the right. General Carroll's division, 1269 strong, occupied 800 yards in the center, and General Coffee, about 700 strong the remainder on the left." If Colonel Latour furnished such a plan of the lines he knew it to be incorrect. It was your duty to know the length of Gen. Carroll's line you were ordered to cover, and support him. You are too good a judge of distance to mistake 350 yards, the actual space occupied by Gen. Carroll's command for 800. But this falsehood was necessary to give currency to another which you had in view—to impose on the world a belief of Gen. Carroll's occupying a space of 800 yards that you might assume the ground you have taken, when you say "the Kentucky detachment was marched to the breastwork in two lines in close order, occupying the rear of the Tennessee troops, an extent of *not more* than 400 yards, with their center in front of the enemy's colum." This was to enforce the idea of your having in action 1200 men, as 400 yards, at close order in two lines gives room for 1200. You acknowledge then that you did not occupy more than half the distance that Genl Carroll did. Lt. Gadsden, my aid-de-camp, who lately measured the line by my orders accompanied by Doctor Kerr, Hospital Surgeon in the army, and who was on the line during the seige, makes its whole length 1537 # yards—575 # yards on the right of the line was occupied by Col. Ross's command; his aggregate about 1327 men 350 yards in the centre by Gen. Carroll, with 1227 privates, his aggregate being 1414. The residue 613 yards by Gen'l Coffee's brigade, 692 privates, aggregate 804. This sir, is the correct length of my line, and the distance occupied by the troops. You therefore, from your own admission, only occupied 175 yards, which at close order in two lines would give about 505 men; and this I always believed was fully the amount of your numbers on the

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line in the battle of the 8th January; though to do you ample justice they were given in my official report at 550.

I will now present you with Major Dillahunty's statements, not for your information but for the public's. You well know the facts stated to be true. "On the morning of the 8th the Kentucky detachment marched in line to the works, their right covering Gen'l Carroll's division, their left extending about one third of the length of his (Gen. Carroll) line. They remained in that situation until just before the action commenced when they inclined to the left so far that their right was just above the battery under the direction of Col. Perry leaving about 25 or 30 scattered along between the battery and the right of the Tennesseans, a distance of upwards of 50 yards. He is convinced that their numbers did not exceed 450 or 500 at most."

I will now turn my attention to your remarks on the conduct of the troops on the west bank of the Mississippi. I have always believed, and so stated to you at Orleans, that the Court of Enquiry placed those troops on ground, *at least, as high* as they deserved. In all your communications you call my attention to the evidence before the Court of Enquiry That evidence was carefully examined. From the good private character of Col. Davis as given to me by my aid-de-camp, Major Thomas L. Butler, I was gratified that the court acquitted him of any conduct deserving censure. There are many men of good private character, who are not qualified to command, especially raw and untrained troops such as yours were. But however I might be pleased with the acquittal of Col. Davis, still I saw falsehoods in the testimony, and which of my own knowledge I pronounce such. It was stated in the evidence and reiterated to me in your letter of the 20th of March, that Col Davis' detachment after h[a]ving retreated to and formed on Gen'l Morgan—received the —of the enemy, and fired from *three to seven rounds* . You know, sir, very well, that when the enemy advanced on the right bank of the river, the parapet of my line being crowded with officers and soldiers, I ordered that they should take off their hats, and give our troops on the right bank three cheers. Whilst in the act of—I saw the right of Gen. Morgan's line precipitately give way. That was—Il drilled soldiers—ort of loading and firing, could

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not have discharged the piece three times before the——ny paces, retiring with the utmost precipitancy. I therefore knew the statement to be false and every person who witnessed this distressing scene knew it also. I have and always will endeavor to reward the brave with my approbation but no influence however extensive, no irritation however strong shall ever cause me to deviate from what I believe to be correct to do an act of injustice to brave men by approbating the coward who deserts in the hour of danger. If such conduct towards the deserving can be termed a prejudice I glory to possess it.—present a correct idea—the confusion—name—. I hereto annex——ed—the account given—Capt Wilkins commanding the Natchez volunteers company, also the note of Nicholas C. Hall and the statement of Washington Jackson and refer you to Mr John Metcalf, living at Paris, Kentucky. They are all gentlemen of as high standing for probity and honor as any in society, all members of that corps. Mr. Metcalf perhaps knows many of the deserters and can speak positively on that subject.<sup>6</sup>

6 On this point Jackson introduces as a supporting statement the letter of Capt. J. C. Wilkins, printed on p. 294, n. 1, *ante*, and the following:

“I was a member of the Natchez Vol. Rifle corps commanded by Capt. J. C. Wilkins, and was a witness to the flight of our troops, on the right bank of the river, on the morning of the 8th January 1815; and although I have no personal knowledge that they were of the Kentuck line, yet it was so reported and believed in camp.

“(signed) Nich'l C. Hall,”

“If General Jackson should want any information respecting the Kentucky militia on the west side of the Mississippi, on the morning of the 8th of January 1815, I would refer him to the following gentlemen.

“At Natchez.

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“James C. Wilkins, then capt. Natchez volunteer rifle company, Anthony Campbell, then Lieutenant in do. N. C. Hall, merchant in New Orleans, then in the above company. George Banks Natchez, then in said company.

“They could certify of meeting the Militia in squads; on the forenoon of the 8th running off mostly without arms, and that after getting to Gen. Morgan's lines, where we had retreated to, Col. Davis of the Kentucky Militia, could not muster more than twenty or thirty men, it then being necessary to ascertain the force on the ground.

“(signed) W. Jackson.”

This was not the only falsehood that appeared in the evidence given before the court of Enquiry. It was stated in the evidence that Col. Davis's detachment amounted to only 200 men. I saw this also reiterated in your letter of the 20th of March. I saw it stated on Morgan's line at 170. No report, or evidence to support this ever came before me and from the report of Genl Morgan, but one man of Col. Davis's command was wounded, none of the Kentuckians were taken prisoners on that day, as I ever understood. Col. Davis' report (verbal) as communicated to me by Gen. Morgan, made his strength, when he reached him, to be about 260. His own official report on the 11th stated them at 271, and his official report on the 12th at 314. Taking all these things into consideration, I could not but believe that the evidence on this point before the court was incorrect. You know sir, that the statements of hundreds warranted this belief—and you know Captain Wilkin's company was composed of gentlemen of the first respectability; some of them Kentuckians, who would therefore scarcely be supposed to have feelings of hostility towards those troops. And likewise you know, that I had no inclination to do anything but justice to all, agreeably to the evidence of truth, and its convictions on my mind. You had no reason to suppose I had any feelings which could prompt me to do injustice to any portion of the troops under my command. You ought not therefore to have suffered the prejudices of the Kentuckians to warp your judgement. You should not have permitted the tide of their local feelings to carry you beyond the reach of truth and justice. You ought to have suffered the thing

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to die, particularly as you knew and have so expressed yourself that if there was blame imputable to any it could not possibly attach itself to me.

A few more remarks on your letter to the Editors of the Reporter and I have done. You say I am unwilling to dismiss the Kentuckians without a “side wipe”, alluding to the affair under Col. Hinds on the Bayou Bienvenue, and thus proceed: “The General cannot have forgotten the conversation that took place between him and myself, the next day on that subject. If he has I will again assure him that Major Johnson who commanded the Kentuckians on that detachment, was extremely anxious that a strict investigation and scrutiny, should be had into his conduct.” I can assure you sir, I have not forgotten it, and there are others also who remember it; as well as the conversation with Colonel Harrison, your Inspector General, who admitted that the report that Col. Hinds made to me of the flight of the Kentucky detachment at the firing of the carronade, *was true*, adding that the troopers had set the example. I replied it was incorrect, except as it might relate to two or three of them, who, as I understood, were afterwards expelled from the corps. But I can assure you, that in all our conversation that day, Major Johnson's name was not mentioned, as is recollected by myself or staff, nor is he reported by Col. Hinds as commanding the detachment. A copy of Col. Hinds official report is in the hands of the Editors of the Reporter. They requested it, and my Adjutant General sent it to them by mail. It is really unfortunate that you have not kept a better record of our details, and reports, as your recollection appears to be bad, and your assertions unfortunate.

Having been unavoidably drawn before the public, I will take a final leave of this disagreeable subject by remarking that a good [exc] use does not require that sophistry to obtain its reward, which has been resorted to by yourself and the Editors of the Reporter. Merit will always meet its due.

I am, sir, yours etc. etc.



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P.S. Having understood that you were in town this morning I requested Dr Bronaugh of my staff, to wait on you and state that the foregoing letter was preparing and that it was my wish you should remain in town until this evening, when a copy would be furnished. I learned on the return of the Doctor that your engagements were such as to prevent a compliance. I regretted this the more as the whole of the documents upon which the statements are founded are in my office and my Adj General's office. Your not having remained agreeably to my wish determined me to give it immediate publicity. Upon mature reflection, I have concluded to send it directly to yourself, that you may have time before publication, to adopt such measures as you may deem correct, I shall await the necessary time for its acknowledgement.